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ABSTRACT
This study is an examination of the relationship between hindsight bias and posttraumatic
guilt. There is some evidence that guilt following a trauma is caused, at least in part, by
the hindsight bias. However, the researchers behind this theory have not tested this theory
utilizing the hypothetical experimental design for hindsight bias or tested their conception
of hindsight bias in terms of foreseeability and inevitability. This study attempted to do
just that. Participants were presented with a scenario about a friend in a car accident.
Participants in the foresight group received no outcome. Participants in the hindsight
groups were told the outcome of the scenario (the friend died) and were then divided into
four different groups: Guilt, No Guilt, List, No List. After reading their respective
outcomes, half of the hindsight participants were instructed to list two alternative
outcomes to the scenario. Previous research has demonstrated that this exercise can
reduce or eliminate the hindsight bias. Participants did not demonstrate the hindsight bias
in this study, and no support for previous research was obtained. The foresight group
regularly expressed more distress and guilt cognitions than the hindsight group.
Comparing hindsight groups revealed that listing two alternative outcomes caused
participants to judge the outcome as less inevitable but not less foreseeable. This study
suggests that the link between hindsight bias and posttraumatic guilt may not be a simple
causal relationship, as previous research has suggested.
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INTRODUCTION

To many, hindsight bias feels like a familiar concept, because they can readily
recall a situation when it has occurred. To be precise, it is the inclination to overestimate
how much we used to know about a certain event, before we discovered the truth (Pezzo,
2011). It is sometimes called Monday morning quarterbacking (Kubany, 1997), or the Iknew-it-all-along phenomenon. Some theorize that the reason it is so difficult to separate
what we know now from what we knew and felt in the past is because new information is
rapidly and seamlessly integrated with old information in our minds, making them almost
indistinguishable (Dilich, Fessel, Goebelbecker, & Roese, 2011; Fischhoff, 1975).
Put another way, Roese & Vohs (2012) define hindsight bias as, “the inability to
recapture the feelings of uncertainty that preceded an event” (p. 411). This definition cuts
to the center of the danger of hindsight bias – if an individual cannot recall what they
were feeling or thinking during a crucial moment, how can they look back and find
justification for their actions? Hindsight bias, which is essentially knowledge of an
outcome, skews our perception of our own behavior.
Research on hindsight bias stretches back several decades when a seminal article
by Fischhoff (1975) was published demonstrating the effects of the phenomenon. In this
study, participants were instructed to read an account of an historical event or a clinical
event. Most of the participants were told the ending (he referred to them as the “After”
groups), and one group for each story was not told an ending, but given four different
possible endings (referred to as the “Before” group). Then all of the participants were
given the list of possible outcomes, and had to make judgments about how likely each
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one was. Participants who knew the ending to the story were told to ignore it, and be as
objective as possible. Despite these instructions, participants in those groups were unable
to ignore what they knew, and consistently rated the “real” outcome they read about as
more likely than participants in the other group (who did know which ending was
correct). This difference in judgments demonstrates hindsight bias. Since then,
Fischhoff’s “hypothetical” design has been used many times to capture the hindsight bias.
Yopchick & Kim (2012) pointed out the importance of the type and amount of
relevant or irrelevant information in hindsight bias studies. They found that hindsight bias
was only found when additional information in support of the outcome was present. They
determined that one additional sentence with relevant information pointing towards a
certain outcome was enough to cause hindsight bias in comparison to length scenarios
that are more commonly used.
Researchers have divided hindsight bias into different components including
inevitability and foreseeability (Roese & Vohs, 2012; Blank & Peters, 2010). These
researchers argue that hindsight bias can, and should, be measured on the basis of these
different types. Roese & Vohs (2012) give detailed explanations of each type of hindsight
bias. Beliefs about inevitability encompass our view of the “objective state of the world,”
or our judgment about whether an event was predetermined or not (Roese & Vohs, 2012,
p. 412). In contrast, beliefs about foreseeability are subjective, and address how a specific
individual may come to believe that they knew it all along, where others could not have.
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Hindsight Bias and the Multidimensional Model of Guilt
Trauma survivors frequently express feelings of irrational guilt (Kubany, 1997;
Kubany & Watson, 2003).The relationship between trauma and guilt extends to survivors
of many different types of trauma: victims of accidents, natural disasters, crimes, and
wars. Kubany and Watson (2003) define guilt as the, “unpleasant feeling with
accompanying beliefs that one should have thought, felt, or acted differently (with
implications of responsibility, wrongdoing, and/or insufficient justification)” (p. 53). Not
everyone who suffers a traumatic event develops feelings of guilt, however.
Understanding the elements that must be present for guilt to develop is the first step to
discovering why some people feel guilt after a traumatic event, while others do not.
Kubany & Watson (2003) developed a multidimensional model of guilt, placing
emphasis on hindsight bias within this theory. They proposed that outcome knowledge
leads to hindsight biased thinking, which leads to guilt cognitions, specifically one’s
perceived (1) insufficient justification for actions taken, (2) responsibility for a negative
outcome, (3) violation of values, (4) preventability and foreseeability of the trauma, and
(5) the distress caused by the negative outcome. These guilt cognitions largely determine
the presence or absence of guilty feelings, and the strength of those feelings. Therefore,
they propose that eliminating or minimizing guilt cognitions should also affect guilty
feelings regarding a certain event.
Thus far, the multidimensional model of guilt has not been tested while utilizing
the hypothetical design to assess hindsight bias originally used by Fischoff (1975), which
requires a foresight and hindsight group. In an unpublished study using college students
with six different experiments, Kubany, Watson, Leisen, & Kaplan (2002) tested the
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model, using a pre-post test to measure guilt cognitions and Kubany’s own scale of
hindsight bias/responsibility. In two of the experiments, participants read a scenario with
a traumatic outcome, rated their responses to that scenario, were given prevention
information, and then rated their responses again. Kubany theorized that information that
could have prevented an unfortunate outcome if only it had been known before the
outcome (therefore making the negative outcome appear more predictable) would
increase guilt and distress. The presence of hindsight bias was assumed by increases in
the amount of guilt cognitions (responsibility, justification, wrongdoing, preventability)
and distress participants admitted to after receiving preventability information. After
reading that information, participants believed they should have known better than to
behave as they did, and they could only have based that judgment on information they
received after the outcome was known. Without the presence of a foresight to hindsight
comparison, it is not clear whether Kubany’s measure of hindsight bias is accurate.
Whether or not this measure of “hindsight bias” is equivalent to the hindsight bias found
by measuring inevitability and foreseeability in a hypothetical model has not been
established.
In a previous, unpublished study, we (Hom & Johnson, 2014) combined the
foreseeability/inevitability measures of hindsight bias with Kubany's Trauma Related
Guilt Inventory (which measures guilt cognitions, including hindsight
bias/responsibility). This study used a repeated measures design with college students
randomly assigned to foresight, hindsight-positive, and hindsight-negative groups. They
made hindsight and guilt judgments after reading a traumatic scenario about a car
accident, and then made the same judgments again after being presented with prevention
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information (information that, had they known it at the time, would have changed the
outcome of the scenario). No evidence of hindsight bias was found before or after
receiving the prevention information when the measure was comprised of foreseeability
and inevitability. However, Kubany's hindsight bias/responsibility scale did show
significant differences between foresight-hindsight conditions, particularly after the
prevention information was known.
In addition, our study did show part of the pattern of hindsight bias and guilt that
is described in the multidimensional model of guilt, where guilt and hindsight
bias/responsibility occur together. After the preventability information, both hindsight
bias/responsibility and guilt cognition scores significantly increased for the hindsight
group. Hindsight bias/responsibility scores for the foresight group increased as well, but
their guilt scores were not significantly affected.

Reducing Hindsight Bias
If hindsight bias results from the rapid and seamless integration of new
information into our memories without being able to remember how much we used to
know, then eliminating hindsight bias should be very difficult. If an individual cannot
make sense of a series of events and how they relate to the outcome, hindsight bias will
not develop (Pezzo, 2011). In fact, if a person cannot make sense of an outcome or does
not understand a series of events, then the outcome is surprising, and such participants
express feelings of never having been able to predict the outcome (sometimes known as
reverse hindsight bias; Pezzo, 2003).
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Being able to eliminate hindsight bias becomes particularly important if Kubany
and Watson's multidimensional model of guilt is accurate, and feelings of guilt and guilt
cognitions really are based on the hindsight bias. In that case, reducing the influence of
outcome information from a trauma survivor's mind would greatly decrease their guilt
(Kubany and Watson, 2003).
It has been demonstrated that simply informing people of the effect does not
reduce the bias (Fischhoff, 1977; Davies, 1987). Davies (1987) also found that providing
participants with a record of their thoughts and predictions before learning an outcome
reduces hindsight bias but has little real-world utility.
One method that has been found to be effective for reducing hindsight bias
involves having participants consider (i.e. list) alternative outcomes (Arkes, Guilmette,
Faust, & Hart, 1988; Roese & Vohs, 2012; Sanna & Schwarz, 2007; Sanna, Schwarz, &
Small, 2002;Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002; Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977). Davies
(1987) referred to this technique as the “availability-of-reasons” mechanism, and
concluded that this method may even be more effective in reducing hindsight bias than
reinstating the “foresight state of mind” by providing pre-outcome thoughts to
participants. It is possible that listing a few alternative outcomes may lessen the error in
logic that comes from hindsight bias.
It has been shown that instructing people to consider only a few alternative
outcomes is effective in reducing hindsight bias, while forcing them to produce many
alternative outcomes actually increases hindsight bias (Roese & Vohs, 2012 Sanna,
Schwarz, & Small, 2002;Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002;). This finding has to do with
the difficulty of the task. Listing only two alternative outcomes is relatively easy, making
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all outcomes seem equally probable; forcing participants to think of many alternatives is
relatively difficult, making all those alternatives seem less likely than the “real” outcome
(increasing hindsight bias in the process).

The Current Study
The current study combines measures of hindsight bias (foreseeability and
inevitability) and Kubany's Trauma Related Guilt Inventory (TRGI). Participants in
foresight and hindsight conditions will make judgments based on a scenario about a car
accident involving a friend who may die, for which each group will receive a different
ending (or, in the case of the foresight group, no ending). The scenario was based on one
used by Howell (2006).
A 2 (Outcome: guilt vs. no guilt) X 2 (List: list vs. no list) factorial design with
one comparison group was utilized, meaning there is a total of five groups. Four of the
groups were be in the hindsight condition with a foresight condition representing the
baseline. The hindsight condition was further split into guilt and no guilt groups. The
hindsight - guilt condition was added to more specifically address the guilt cognitions
that are supposed to control the strength of guilty feelings. Participants in the hindsight –
no guilt group simply read, “Before she could be rescued, your friend dies.” The
hindsight – guilt group read that information and another paragraph about the guilt
cognitions the participant experiences as a result of the friend’s death. This was done in
an attempt to intensify the guilt cognitions for the guilt group as compared to the no guilt
group, and therefore increase the guilt group’s guilty feelings and hindsight bias. Half of

7

the hindsight conditions (guilt and no guilt groups) were instructed to list two alternative
outcomes before making any judgments.
In this study, I planned to determine whether hindsight bias was present through
the foreseeability and inevitability measures along with Kubany's hindsight
bias/responsibility scale, using the hypothetical method (the presence of foresight and
hindsight groups). In order to better understand the role of guilt cognitions, I used the
hindsight-guilt condition, where guilty feelings are made more explicit in the outcome
(for example, by directly telling the participant that they feel terrible about not saving the
friend).
Following those objectives, I predicted that the participants who were in the
listing condition would exhibit less hindsight bias and fewer guilt cognitions, than
participants who were not in the listing conditions. As guilt cognitions are, in theory,
heavily dependent on measures of foreseeability, inevitability, and Kubany's measure of
hindsight bias/responsibility (Kubany & Watson, 2003), I also predicted that the
hindsight group would exhibit more guilt cognitions than the foresight group. Further, the
hindsight – guilt group was expected to experience more hindsight bias and guilt
cognitions than the hindsight – no guilt group.
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METHODS

A total of 167 Missouri State University students were used as participants in this
study (78 males and 89 females).
Prior approval for this project was obtained from the Missouri State University
IRB (October 10, 2014; approval #15-0144). There were five different conditions, with
approximately 35 participants randomly assigned to each group. A 2 (Outcome: guilt vs.
no guilt) X 2 (List: list vs. no list) design (with one baseline group) was used for this
study. Four of the groups were in the hindsight condition and a foresight condition
represented the baseline. Each condition was balanced for sex so that a proportional
number of men and women were randomly assigned to each group.
Participants in the foresight condition (baseline group) were not told an outcome.
Immediately after reading the scenario about a friend in a serious car accident, foresight
participants were instructed to consider what different outcomes may result. Then, in the
instructions given for completing the measures of inevitability, foreseeability,
emotionality, and the TRGI, the participants were instructed to make those judgments as
if the friend died.
Participants in the hindsight conditions were given the scenario about a car
accident to read, with the outcome consisting of their friend dying in the wrecked car.
The hindsight condition has no guilt, guilt, list, and no list groups.
Participants in the no guilt condition simply read that their friend died.
Participants in the guilt condition read a more detailed outcome, describing how the
friend’s death affected their subsequent moods and thoughts. The additional details were
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based directly on the types of guilt cognitions Kubany & Watson (2003) stated cause
guilty feelings, which are perceived wrongdoing, personal responsibility, lack of
justification for one’s actions, and preventability of the trauma (for example, lack of
justification was addressed with the sentence, "Things you could have done differently in
the moments before her death haunt you…”).
Half of the participants in the guilt and the no guilt groups were told to list two
alternative outcomes to the one they read about after they read the scenario. The other
half did not list anything, but proceeded directly to the dependent measures.
The participants then made ratings on a hindsight bias measure, separated into
foreseeability and inevitability. Participants also described their emotional response to the
scenario (surprise, disappointment, regret, disgust). The Trauma-Related Guilt Inventory
(TRGI) is a scale developed by Kubany et al. (1996) to measure distress, hindsight
bias/responsibility, wrongdoing, and lack of justification for one’s actions, which are all
different types of guilt cognitions. All measures utilize Likert scales, where higher
numbers indicate agreement (Totally agree/Extremely True) and lower numbers express
disagreement (Do not agree/Not at all True).
At the end of the study, participants were also asked to complete an open-ended
question about their thoughts and feelings about the study. Participants were asked to
provide demographic information, including gender, ethnicity, and age. An opportunity
for interested participants to be debriefed about the purpose of the study was offered.
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RESULTS

Composite Scores
Before analyses, data were checked for accuracy and outliers. Missing data were
determined to be random, and mean substitution was utilized. Five multivariate outliers
were removed. Data were found to be multivariate normal and linear, and homogeneity
was met.
The foreseeability, inevitability, and emotionality composites utilized in this study
were based on Blank & Peters’ (2010) measures. The emotionality composite included
participants’ judgments of disappointment, regret, disgust, and how upset the outcome
made them overall. The foreseeability composite included participant’s judgments about
how predictable the outcome was, how difficult it would be to predict the outcome, and
how anticipated the outcome was. The inevitability composite included judgments about
how objectively probable, unavoidable, and certain the outcome was. The internal
consistencies of each factor were checked, and determined to be satisfactory, with
Cronbach’s αs of .78 (foreseeability), .74 (inevitability), and .82 (emotionality). Surprise
was not part of a composite scale, but was measured by asking how surprising they found
the outcome to be, employing the same Likert scale used for the other measures.
Kubany et al.’s (1996) TRGI scales were also checked for internal consistency. Of
these scales, the Distress Scale (Cronbach’s α=.88), the Guilt Cognitions Scale (α=.86),
the Hindsight Bias/Responsibility Subscale (α=.80), the Wrongdoing Subscale (α=.72),
and the Lack of Justification Subscale (α=.65) all had satisfactory to good reliability. The
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Global Guilt Scale was the only one with poor reliability (α=-.24), and it was removed
from analyses.

Hindsight Effects
In our previous study (Hom & Johnson, 2014), sex proved to be an influential
factor, and therefore was included in all analyses. To establish the presence of hindsight
bias, a 2 (groups: foresight vs. hindsight no guilt, no list) X 2 (male vs. female)
MANOVA was used to compare the foreseeability and inevitability composite scores.
The test showed that the main effect for groups approached significance [F(2, 59)=2.94,
p=.06, n2=.091]. There was not a main effect for sex [F(2, 59)=.366, p=.695, n2=.012],
and there was not a signification interaction [F(2, 59)=1.06, p=.354, n2=.035].
Descriptive statistics for each group are included in Table 1.
There were no significant univariate differences for the inevitability composite
based on groups [F(1, 60)=1.42, p=.239, n2=.023]. Foreseeability composite scores were
different for the hindsight and foresight groups [F(1, 60)=25.98, p=.017, n2=.091]. Had
the main effect for groups reached significance, it could safely be said that the
participants showed the hindsight bias, due to the fact that the hindsight (no guilt, no list)
group reported higher scores on the foreseeability measure than the foresight group.
Another 2 (groups: foresight vs. hindsight no guilt, no list) X 2 (male vs. female)
MANOVA tested emotionality and surprise. Those scores did not show significant
differences between groups [F(2, 59)=1.53, p=.225, n2=.049], sex [F(2, 59)=.967,
p=.386, n2=.032], or in the interaction [F(2, 59)=1.50, p=.231, n2=.048].
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A 2 (groups: foresight vs hindsight no guilt, no list) X 2 (male vs. female)
MANOVA was conducted to examine whether outcome information had any effect on
the TRGI. A significant main effect was found for groups [F(5, 56)=2.50, p=.041,
n2=.182], but not for sex [F(5, 56)=.179, p=.970, n2=.016]. There was not a significant
interaction between these variables [F(5, 56)=.179, p=.410, n2=.084].
Foresight and hindsight scores differed on the Guilt Cognitions Scale [F(1,
60)=8.56, p=.007, n2=.125], Distress Scale [F(1, 60)=7.77, p=.007, n2=.115], Hindsight
Bias/Responsibility Subscale [F(1, 60)=5.94, p=.018, n2=.090], and Wrongdoing
Subscale [F(1, 60)=8.87, p=.004, n2=.129]. Those scores were not different for the Lack
of Justification Subscale [F(1, 60)=2.11, p=.152, n2=.034]. The hindsight (no guilt, no
list) condition reported lower scores than the foresight group for the Guilt Cognitions
Scale, Distress Scale, Hindsight Bias/Responsibility Subscale, and Wrongdoing Subscale.
The data show that the hindsight bias was not demonstrated, and likewise no
significant differences between groups were found for emotionality or surprise. However,
the hindsight participants did show lesser scores for the Guilt Cognitions Scale, Distress
Scale, Hindsight Bias/Responsibility Subscale, and Wrongdoing Subscale in comparison
to the foresight participants, which demonstrates that outcome information (or lack
thereof) did have an effect on participants, but only in respect to the TRGI scales.

Guilt and Alternative Outcomes
In order to examine the relationship between the other independent variables
(guilt and listing), the four hindsight groups were examined independently of the
foresight group. The focus here is the different types of outcome information presented to
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participants, and how they interact with each other to influence hindsight judgments and
guilt cognitions.
A 2 (guilt vs. no guilt) X 2 (listing vs. no listing) X 2 (male vs. female)
MANOVA was used to determine these independent variables’ effects on the
foreseeability composite and the inevitability composite. Only the hindsight groups were
used. A significant main effect for listing [F(2, 126)=6.13,p=.003, n2=.089] was found,
but not for guilt [F(2, 126)=1.16,p=.318, n2=.018], sex [F(2, 126)=.306,p=.737, n2=.005],
or any interaction between listing, guilt, and/or sex (p>.05).
Univariate differences were significant for only the inevitability composite [F(1,
127)=9.69, p=.002, n2=.071]. Inevitability scores were significantly lower for participants
who made a list of alternative outcomes after they learned the outcome than they were for
participants who did not make a list of alternatives. This shows that asking participants to
consider how the outcome could have been different (i.e. listing alternative outcomes) did
change they how viewed the outcome, in that they found it to be less inevitable than the
other hindsight groups.
To examine emotionality and surprise, another 2 (guilt vs. no guilt) X 2 (listing
vs. no listing) X 2 (male vs. female) MANOVA was conducted. Significant main effects
for guilt [F(2, 126)=3.61, p=.03, n2=.054] and sex [F(2, 126)=5.01, p=.008, n2=.074]
were found. Significant main effects were not found for listing [F(2, 126)=.035, p=.966,
n2=.001] or between any of the interactions (p>.05).
Univariate differences for surprise scores were found for the guilt condition [F(1,
127)=7.12, p=.009, n2=.053]. In this case, the participants in the no guilt condition
reported they were significantly more surprised by the outcome than participants in the
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guilt condition. Guilt scores were not significantly different for the emotionality
composite (p>.05).
Males and females differed significantly on emotionality [F(1, 127)=9.27, p=.003,
n2=.068]. Females reported more negative affect as a result from the outcome than males
did.
Thus far, it has been shown that making participants list alternative outcomes did
mitigate inevitability judgments, as compared to the hindsight groups who were not
requested to make a list of how else the scenario might have ended. The presence of
guilty thoughts and feelings in the outcome did not have an effect on foreseeability or
inevitability judgments or negative affect, but did make the outcome less surprising to
participants.
A 2 (guilt vs. no guilt) X 2 (listing vs. no listing) X 2 (male vs. female)
MANOVA testing the TRGI scales was conducted. Only the hindsight groups were
included in this test. A significant main effect for the presence of guilt [F(5, 123)=4.40,
p=.001, n2=.152] and sex [F(5, 123)=3.49, p=.006, n2=.124] was found, but not for
listing [F(5, 123)=.697, p=.627, n2=.028]. There was not a significant interaction between
any of these variables (p>.05).
Univariate guilt scores were significantly different on the Lack of Justification
Subscale [F(1, 127)=17.27, p<.001, n2=.120], where participants in the guilt condition
reported higher scores than participants in the no guilt condition. Differences in guilt
scores were also significant for the Wrongdoing Subscale, [F(1, 127)=3.89, p=.051,
n2=.030]. As with the Lack of Justification Subscale, participants in the guilt condition
reported higher scores for the Wrongdoing Subscale than the participants in the no guilt
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condition. The Wrongdoing Subscale measures whether participants perceive their
actions to have violated their personal standards, and the Lack of Justification Subscale
measures how justified or warranted they believe their actions were. The pattern of these
results shows that including guilty thoughts and feelings in the outcome made
participants feel that their actions were less in line with their values and less justified than
the other participants felt about their actions.
Males and females reported significantly different scores on the Distress Scale
[F(1, 127)=12.38, p=.001, n2=.089]. Females scored higher on this scale than males did.
The result is very similar to what was found for the emotionality composite, where
females again reported more negative affect than males.
Listing alternative outcomes did not have an effect on any of the TRGI scales, but
did result in participants judging the outcome as less inevitable than participants in the
other hindsight groups who did not list anything. The guilt manipulation did not affect
their foreseeability and inevitability judgments, but did influence the TRGI scales.
Specifically, the presence of guilty thoughts and feelings in the outcome made
participants feel their actions were less justified given the situation, and possibly even
more to blame for the ultimate outcome. These guilty thoughts and feelings also affected
how surprised participants were. Overall, adding guilty thoughts and feelings to the
outcome made participants less surprised by the outcome and more critical of their
actions.
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DISCUSSION

Hindsight and Foresight Differences
In the hypothetical method, hindsight bias is shown by a difference in hindsight
and foresight conditions, where the hindsight condition judges the known outcome to be
more likely than the foresight condition. Here I examined hindsight bias in terms of
foreseeability and inevitability, and the same principle for proving the presence of the
bias applies. In this case, the pattern of the foreseeability and inevitability judgments
between the foresight and the hindsight (no guilt, no list) groups were in the direction that
typifies hindsight bias, but they were not enough to reach significance. One explanation
for this is that the scenario used in this study may not have had all the elements necessary
to prompt the hindsight bias.
Another explanation comes from research on hindsight bias concerning selfrelevant negative outcomes (Pezzo, 2003; Blank & Peters, 2010). Research has been able
to demonstrate the hindsight bias in response to personally disappointing outcomes
(Tycocinski, 2001). Other research has found that participants will not develop hindsight
bias when the outcome reflects negatively upon themselves, but they will develop
hindsight bias when the outcomes reflect positively on them (Louie, 1999). Louie
theorized that this was because people were inclined to be surprised and attempted to
make sense of what happened in the face of a negative outcome. Essentially, they must
search for reasons behind different outcomes, which decreases the hindsight bias (Slovic
& Fischhoff, 1977; Sanna &Schwartz, 2007).
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An important caveat here is that participants in this study did not have the
opportunity to make a decision or act in any way, and it may be called into question
whether the fictional friend’s death qualifies as a self-relevant negative outcome. The
friend’s death could be interpreted as a personal failure on the part of the participant, and
so it is possible they did not demonstrate hindsight bias because a very effective
neutralizer, negative implications for themselves, was built into the scenario. If they had
admitted they knew what was going to happen, and did not prevent it, they would have to
judge their actions to be grossly negligent.
To my knowledge, very few studies have attempted to examine the hypothetical
model of hindsight bias as it pertains to posttraumatic guilt (Howell, 2006). The scenario
used in this study was meant to be distressing and personal in order to examine the
relationship between posttraumatic guilt and hindsight bias, but it is possible that the
aspects of the scenario that were supposed to induce guilt interfered with the
development of the bias.
The pattern of results that emerged between the foresight and hindsight (no guilt,
no list) group in regards to the TRGI scales are difficult to interpret in light of the
multidimensional model, as Kubany & Watson (2003) do not theorize what happens to
the five different types of guilt cognitions when hindsight bias is not present. Hindsight
participants consistently reported lower TRGI scores than the foresight participants,
which is the opposite of what I hypothesized. This result is particularly noteworthy for
the Hindsight Bias/Responsibility Subscale. This scale showed that foresight participants
reported they felt the outcome to be less preventable and that their actions were less
blameworthy. The scenario did not provoke the hindsight bias (in terms of foreseeability
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and inevitability), so this calls into question whether or not the Hindsight
Bias/Responsibility Subscale is related to hindsight bias. Had these measures all been
examining hindsight bias, a similar pattern of results would be expected. On the other
hand, an argument could be made that the Hindsight Bias/Responsibility Subscale
addresses a different component of hindsight bias, aside from foreseeability and
inevitability. Perhaps posttraumatic guilt (the focus of Kubany and Watson’s research) is
more closely related to this proposed component of hindsight bias than it is to
foreseeability or inevitability, and that is why I found the pattern of results that I did.
As for the rest of the TRGI scales, hindsight participants reported lower Distress
Scale, Wrongdoing Subscale, and Guilt Cognitions Scale scores, which could be a
demonstration of defensive processing of negative affect, similar to what was discussed
earlier in reference to self-relevant negative outcomes. The belief that the friend may
have actually survived could have allowed the foresight participants to lay claim to more
distress and negative self-evaluations without actually suffering from them, unlike the
hindsight group. The hindsight group were left to cope with reality as best they could,
which seemingly resulted in the minimization or denial of their guilty thoughts and
feelings. In the wake of a tragedy, it is more adaptive to fairly assess and minimize guilt,
self-blame, and distress than to magnify them (Kubany, 1997).

Guilt and Alternative Outcomes
Requesting participants to consider alternative outcomes mitigated inevitability
(but not foreseeability) judgments in comparison to the other hindsight groups that did
not list anything, partially fulfilling my original hypothesis. Much of the other research
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examining the reduction of hindsight bias through listing alternative outcomes utilizes
scenarios involving psychology experiments (Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977; Davies, 1987),
medical case studies (Arkes, Guilmette, Faust, & Hart, 1988), or the infamous BritishGurkha War (Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002; Sanna, Schwarz, & Small, 2002). It is
doubtful that participants in these studies considered the scenarios very upsetting, but
they did demonstrate hindsight bias through a foresight-hindsight comparison of scores.
Researchers were able to show that listing alternatives reduced the bias by comparing
different hindsight groups’ scores, just as it was done in this study. However, none of the
previous research cited here measured hindsight bias in terms of foreseeability and
inevitability. The data demonstrates that listing alternative outcomes was an effective
method for decreasing inevitability judgments amongst the hindsight groups for a
personally upsetting scenario, but this method was not effective in influencing
foreseeability judgments.
The apparent lack of effect that listing alternatives had on foreseeability
judgments suggests that listing alternatives influences how participants view the
probability of a series of events more than how they view the accuracy of their own
judgment. Whereas inevitability concerns itself with objective probabilities (“it” was
inevitable), foreseeability focuses on what an individual is capable of knowing at any one
point in time, and how predictable an outcome is in light of that information (“I” could
foresee it). As listing alternatives is primarily an exercise dealing with unbiased, real-life
possible outcomes, it is reasonable that inevitability would be the component of hindsight
bias most affected by it. Contrary to my hypothesis, listing alternatives also had no effect
on guilt cognitions (the TRGI scales), which do tend to focus more on participants’
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subjective perceptions of their behavior and the amount of knowledge they had during a
certain event (concepts that are also related to foreseeability).
The guilt manipulation did have an effect on the TRGI scales. Kubany & Watson
(2003) listed five different types of guilt cognitions, which are perceived lack of
justification for one’s actions, violation of personal values, responsibility for the
outcome, preventability of the outcome, and distress caused by the outcome. The TRGI
scales and subscales are based on these guilt cognitions. Current findings showed the
manipulation did affect part of the scale on which it was based. Participants in the guilt
condition did, overall, report that they felt their actions were less justified and more
incongruent with their values than participants in the no guilt condition. The presence of
guilt cognitions in the outcome did not make participants feel more distressed or
influence how responsible they felt they were for the outcome. The hypothesis stating
that participants in the guilt condition would experience more guilt cognitions than
participants in the no guilt condition was moderately fulfilled, as I did not attempt to
specify what types of guilt cognitions they would differ in.
In addition, the presence of guilt cognitions in the scenario’s outcome caused
participants to be less surprised by that outcome. One possible explanation for this is that
the participants who read the guilt cognitions had more information to consider than the
other participants. They may have felt the friend’s death was just as surprising as the
other participants did, but felt the guilty feelings and thoughts following the friend’s
death were not very surprising at all. Thus, their surprise would be less than participants
who only learned of the friend’s death.
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These characteristics (feelings that they should have behaved differently and
reduced surprise) are somewhat reminiscent of hindsight bias; after all, hindsight bias is
characterized by the beliefs that one knew what was going to happen and should have
behaved differently. However, the guilt manipulation had no effect on foreseeability or
inevitability amongst hindsight groups, contrary to my hypothesis that it would influence
those measures. Further examination of the relationship between guilt cognitions and
hindsight bias is needed before firm conclusions about Kubany & Watson’s (2003)
multidimensional model of guilt can be drawn.
Current findings were not able to show relationship between hindsight bias and
guilt cognitions. The effect for hindsight bias did not quite reach significant, and the
hindsight group did not exhibit more guilt cognitions than the foresight group. Future
research should pursue a better understanding of the relationship between hindsight bias
and posttraumatic guilt, utilizing a scenario that has proven effective at triggering the
hindsight bias in participants. Additionally, further research should address whether
Kubany’s Hindsight Bias/Responsibility Subscale is tapping into a new component of
hindsight bias, similar to foreseeability and inevitability, utilizing the hypothetical model
designed by Fischhoff (1975).
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for TRGI scales and hindsight bias measures, divided by
group.
Dependent Variable

Group

N

Mean

Std. Error

Global Guilt Scale

Foresight

32

3.20

.085

List

34

3.22

.083

No List

36

3.24

.080

List

34

3.14

.083

No List

31

3.19

.087

32

2.34

.097

List

34

2.17

.094

No List

36

2.25

.091

List

34

2.11

.094

No List

31

1.96

.098

32

4.23

.143

List

34

3.74

.138

No List

36

3.87

.134

List

34

3.81

.138

No List

31

3.64

.145

32

2.43

.128

List

34

2.27

.124

No List

36

2.30

.121

List

34

2.32

.124

No List

31

2.06

.130

32

2.44

.136

List

34

1.97

.132

No List

36

2.22

.128

List

34

1.88

.132

No List

31

1.81

.138

Hindsight

Guilt

No Guilt

Guilt Cognitions

Foresight

Scale

Hindsight

Guilt
No Guilt

Distress Scale

Foresight
Hindsight

Guilt
No Guilt

Hindsight

Foresight

Bias/Responsibility

Hindsight

Guilt

Subscale
No Guilt

Wrongdoing Subscale

Foresight
Hindsight

Guilt
No Guilt

Note. The TRGI, Foreseeability, and Inevitability scales were rated on a 1-5 scale, with 1
meaning “Not at all true/Do not agree,” and 5 meaning “Extremely true/Totally agree.”
Emotionality and surprise were rated on a 1 to 10 scale, with 1 meaning “Not at all” and
10 meaning “Very much.”
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Table 1, continued.
Dependent Variable

Group

N

Mean

Std. Error

Lack of Justification

Foresight

32

2.57

.138

Subscale

Hindsight

List

34

2.99

.134

No List

36

3.04

.130

List

34

2.53

.134

No List

31

2.35

.140

32

8.43

.332

List

34

7.63

.322

No List

36

7.75

.313

List

34

7.79

.322

No List

31

7.74

.337

32

6.16

.456

List

34

4.47

.451

No List

36

5.17

.438

List

34

6.44

.451

No List

31

5.58

.472

32

2.44

.164

List

34

3.00

.159

No List

36

2.94

.154

List

34

2.82

.159

No List

31

2.94

.166

32

2.67

.135

List

34

2.65

.131

No List

36

2.97

.127

List

34

2.33

.131

No List

31

2.86

.137

Guilt
No Guilt

Emotionality

Foresight
Hindsight

Guilt
No Guilt

Surprise

Foresight
Hindsight

Guilt
No Guilt

Foreseeability

Foresight
Hindsight

Guilt
No Guilt

Inevitability

Foresight
Hindsight

Guilt
No Guilt

Note. The TRGI, Foreseeability, and Inevitability scales were rated on a 1-5 scale, with 1
meaning “Not at all true/Do not agree,” and 5 meaning “Extremely true/Totally agree.”
Emotionality and surprise were rated on a 1 to 10 scale, with 1 meaning “Not at all” and
10 meaning “Very much.”
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